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I. Introduction
Metaphors can be enlightening. Consider the following from e e cummings: "when my
love comes to see me it's just a little like music."' This metaphor expresses the sensation
of the love's arrival: the joy, the anticipation. A straightforward, literal description of the
occasion could not capture this experience. One senses the metaphor's meaning here
more than one apprehends it.
Nonetheless, metaphors are delicate.2 Pushing them or leaning too heavily on them
risks distorting the images they were meant to convey.3 For example, if cummings's word
"music" becomes the focal point, it wouldn't take much to insist, implausibly, that the love
arrives while singing.
But metaphors are not the sole provenance of poets. The law has its share of meta-
phors, as well.4 Consider the corporation, often called a "person" or "being" even though
a corporation has no natural characteristics. 5 The metaphor merely expresses the law's
distinction between the group and the individuals who comprise it.
Unfortunately, courts sometimes fix on the "person" metaphor rather than on the un-
derlying structure of the organizational form. Both the United Kingdom in R. (on the
application ofFord) v. Financial Services Authority6 and the United States in the Bevill, Bresler
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1. E. E. CUMMINGS, TULIPS & CHIMNEYS (1976).
2. Kathryn M. Stanchi, Feminist Legal Writing, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 387, 392 n.20 (2002).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 392.
5. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1981).
6. R. (on the application of Ford) v. Financial Services Authority, [2011] EWHC (Admin) 2583, [28]
(Eng.).
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line of cases7 did so when deciding under what circumstances an executive's communica-
tion with corporate counsel creates a personal attorney-client privilege. The United
Kingdom opted for a broad approach that too readily produces a joint-client relationship
with corporate counsel.8 The United States, on the other hand, has a stricter focus that
may impair executive candor.9
This article will analyze both approaches. Thereafter, the issue will be reevaluated
without the tacit assumption that the corporate personality metaphor makes the corpora-
tion a "person" in other settings. A proposal will be offered that is built on the policies of
the privilege and molded to the nature of corporate communications.
But as a prelude, a brief discussion of attorney-client privilege and corporate communi-
cations will follow.
II. Attorney-Client Privilege and Corporate Connunications:
A Brief Overview'0
Attorney-client privilege has long been a part of both British and American law." Its
origins can be traced to a common source, Elizabethan England.12 Although the rationale
for the privilege has changed,13 its function remains the same; privileged communications
between attorney and client are confidential.14 The confidential communications may not
be discovered by an opposing party nor used as evidence unless the client "consents." 5
Attorney-client privilege is an important part of the legal system's goal of providing
justice.16 The connection may be sketched out as follows.1 7 Establishing one's rights and
7. In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986). See generally, JoiN
GERGAcz, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIEN T PRIVILEGE 3D, § 2:10-2:17 (2013).
8. See In re Bevill, 805 F.2d at 125.
9. See R. (on the application of Ford), [20111 EWHC (Admin) 2583, [401.
10. For a more thorough discussion, see GERGACz, supra note 7.
11. "The desirability of protecting confidential communications between attorney and client [a corporation
in the case] as a matter of public policy is too well known and has been too often recognized by text-books
and courts to need extended comment now. If such communications were required to be made the subject to
examination and publication, such enactment would be a practical prohibition upon professional advice and
assistance." United States v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336, 35 S. Ct. 363, 369, 59 L. Ed. 598, 607
(1915); GERGACZ, supra note 7, § 1.16 (2013).
12. See generally JohN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COAMION LAW, Vol. 8, § 2290 (John
T. McNaughton ed., 1961); Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Lawyer-Client Privilege, 66
CAL. L. REv. 1061, 1083 (1978). For a more thorough discussion, see GERGACZ, supra note 7, § 1:22.
13. GERGACZ, supra note 7, § 1:4.
14. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Crosby v. Berger, 11 Paige Ch. 377, 378 (N.Y.
Ch. 1844) ("The object of the rule, protecting privileged communications from being disclosed by the attor-
ney or counsel, is to secure to parties who have confided the facts of their cases to their professional advisers,
as such, the benefit of secrecy in relation to such communications; so that the client may disclose the whole of
his case to his professional adviser, without any danger that the facts thus communicated to his attorney or
counsel will be used in evidence against him, without his own consent.").
15. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396. Note that the privilege protection may be lost in ways other than a client's
voluntary disclosure; for example, inadvertent disclosure or the crime-fraud exception. The quotation marks
surrounding the word "consent," in the text, thus, suggests a loose construction of the term. For a more
thorough discussion of ways in which the privilege may be lost, see GERGACZ, supra note 7, § 4:1-6:50.
16. See Barton v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005) ("fundamental
importance of the attorney-client privilege to our adversarial system of justice.").
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obligations under the law is a complex undertaking.I Thus, attorneys are needed to pro-
vide guidance.' 9 But an attorney's advice is only as good as the information on which it is
based. 20 Inaccurate or incomplete information will yield faulty advice, and the client's
position will be compromised. 21
A key source of counsel's information is the client.22 But candor is not a natural or
easily-acquired characteristic for any person, clients included. 23 Nonetheless, it needs to
be fostered so that the attorney can put together an accurate picture on which to base the
legal advice. 24 Here is where the attorney-client privilege comes into play.
Under the privilege, clients are assured that the information communicated to counsel
will not later be used against them.25 Little more could be done to inhibit client candor
than to turn the attorney into a witness who could divulge client confidences. Conse-
quently, by protecting attorney-client communications, the privilege removes an obstacle
that otherwise would inhibit client candor. 26
However, not every attorney-client conversation is covered by the privilege.27 Only
those that meet certain standards are protected. United States v. United Shoe Machinery
provides a multi-part analysis to distinguish between them. 28
17. "This principle we take to be this; that so numerous and complex are the laws by which the rights and
duties of citizens are governed, so important is it that they should be permitted to avail themselves of the
superior skill and learning of those who are sanctioned by the law as its ministers and expounders, both in
ascertaining their rights in the country, and maintaining them most safely in courts, without publishing those
facts, which they have a right to keep secret, but which must be disclosed to a legal adviser and advocate, to
enable him successfully to perform the duties of his office, that the law has considered it the wisest policy to
encourage and sanction this confidence, by requiring that on such facts the mouth of the attorney shall for
ever be sealed." Hatton v. Robinson, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 416, 422 (1833).
18. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) ("In a society as
complicated in structure as ours and governed by laws as complex and detailed as those impQsed upon us,
expert legal advice is essential.").
19. Id.
20. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
2 1. See id.
22. Valerie Figuerdo, Misadventures into Corporate Prosecutions After the Holder, Thompson, and McNulty
Memoranda, 33 DAYrON L. REV. 1, 11 (2007).
23. Robert E. Hudec, Gatt or Gabb? The Future Design of the General Agreement ofTarifl and Trade, 80 YALE
LJ. 1299, 1320 (1971).
24. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (1981); Crosbyv. Berger, 11 Paige Ch. 377, 378 (N.Y. Ch. 1844) ("The object
of the rule, protecting privileged communications from being disclosed by the attorney or counsel, is to
secure to parties who have confided the facts of their cases to their professional advisers, as such, the benefit
of secrecy in relation to such communications; so that the client may disclose the whole of his case to his
professional adviser, without any danger that the facts thus communicated to his attorney or counsel will be
used in evidence against him, without his own consent.").
25. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981).
26. Id. at 389.
27. Id. at 395; Crosby, 11 Paige Ch. at 378.
28. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 - 359 (D. Mass. 1950) ("The privilege
applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom
the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection
with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney
was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily
either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the
client.").
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The United Shoe factors may be grouped into three categories. The first focuses on the
parties to the communication; 29 the parties must be attorney and client.30 Second, the
communication is required to be confidential when it occurred3' and the confidentiality
must be maintained thereafter.32 Third, the communication needs to facilitate the client
in obtaining legal advice.33
The privilege's rationale and the factors for establishing it derive from a model of a
"human being" as a client.3 4 The client as communicator is protected by the privilege. 35
In addition, the same client-communicator decides whether to assert the privilege and is
even the one who entered into the attorney-client relationship.36 There is no separation
among these "persons."37 The benefits the privilege provides and its operation are united
in a single actor.38
This is not the case for the corporation. Although a corporation can have an attorney-
client privilege, 39 its client identity is the group rather than any members of the organiza-
tion.40 Further, as a metaphorical person, the corporation cannot act on its own.4' Com-
munications with counsel are done by employees.42 Management decides whether to
assert or waive the corporation's privilege.43 Even retaining counsel and entering into an
attorney-client relationship is done by others on the corporation's behalf.44
Consequently, there is a disconnect between the privilege's incentives and designating a
corporation as the privileged client.4s Even so, an attorney-client privilege for corpora-
tions may be justified.46 Consider that the organization itself needs legal advice and, as is
the case for human clients, that advice is only as good as the information on which it is
29. Id.
30. See e.g., Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mut. Reinsurance Bureau, 150 F.R.D. 193, 197 (D. Kan. 1993);
GERGACZ, spra note 7, §§ 2:4-2:17, 3:17-3:35.
31. See e.g., United States v. Bell, 776 F.2d 965, 971 (11th Cit. 1985); GERGACZ, supra note 7,
§§ 3:56-3:66, 5:01-5:63.
32. See e.g., In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("It is horn-
book law that the voluntary disclosure or consent to the disclosure of a communication otherwise subject to a
claim of privilege, effectively waives the privilege").
33. See e.g., Status Time Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 95 F.R.D. 27, 29-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); GERGACZ,
supra note 7, §§ 3:43-3:47.
34. GERGACZ, supra note 7, § 1:16.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981).
38. See id.
39. Id. at 390; Gen. Mediterranean Holdings S.A. v. Patel, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 272, 285 (Eng.).
40. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978) ("Ordinarily, the
privilege belongs to the corporation and an employee cannot himself claim the attorney-client privilege and
prevent disclosure of communications between himself and the corporation's counsel if the corporation has
waived the privilege."); GERGACZ, supra note 7 §§ 1:24, 2:05-2:10.
41. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985).
42. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394; GERGAcZ, supra note 7, §§ 1:24, 3:75-3:92.
43. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348; GERGACZ, supra note 7, §§ 1:24-1:26, 2:35-2:43.
44. GERGACZ, supra note 7, §§ 1:24-1:26, 2:35-2:43.
45. Id. §§ 1:17-l:21.
46. Id.
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based. However, a corporation cannot on its own provide information to counsel.47 Man-
agement must create the policies that do so and specify the executives to carry them out.4 8
But if the communicated information is also available to outsiders, management would
need to weigh that risk with the importance of providing the information to counsel. A
corporate attorney-client privilege gets rid of this dilemma.49 Outsiders have no access.
Thus, the corporation's receipt of sound legal advice is facilitated.50 The disincentive that
can impede organizational information flow to counsel is removed. 5
However, the privilege only protects the corporation. 52 The executive who communi-
cates is not provided for under the doctrine.53 Consequently, if a corporation's privilege is
waived, the communicating executive loses any confidentiality protection the corpora-
tion's privilege indirectly provided. 54
Nonetheless, nothing prohibits corporate counsel from having two clients: the corpora-
tion and the executive.55 Communications with either, at least theoretically, then could be
covered by the attorney-client privilege.56
III. U.S. and U.K. Approaches for Assessing Whether Corporate Counsel
Represents Both the Corporation and the Communicating Executive
Corporate counsel may represent both the corporation and a communicating executive.
Dual attorney-client relationships and independent privileged communications would
arise.s?
At a basic level, consider counsel advising the corporation on a contract matter and at
the same time assisting the executive with an estate plan. A clear delineation between
corporate activity and the executive's personal interests is apparent. The topics of the
communications differ and the type of legal advice would too. Identifying who some par-
ticular legal advice was aimed at and on which communications the advice was based
would be clear-cut.
But a vexing problem arises when a communication has both corporate and personal
implications.58 For example, assume counsel is providing legal advice to the corporation
about an SEC investigation. Because of the executive's role in the matter, personal liabil-
ity may also arise in addition to possible claims against the corporation. 59 Consequently,
the communications' topic and the legal advice may overlap or may switch back-and-forth
47. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985).
48. Id.
49. See Status Time Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 95 F.R.D. 27, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1986).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 124-25; R. (on the application of Ford) v. Financial Services Authority, [2011] EWHC (Admin)
2583, [171, [32] (Eng.); GERGACZ, supra note 7, §§ 1:24, 2:10-2:17.
55. In re Bevill, 805 F.2d at 124.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 124; GERGACZ, supra note 7, §§ 1:24-1:26, 3:64(2).
58. See GERGACZ, supra note 7, § 1:24-1:26, 3:64(2).
59. See id.
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inextricably between personal and corporate liability.60 The same communication may
concern the corporation and the executive simultaneously. 61 Separating the corporate
from the personal here would be a tall order. Nonetheless, establishing "separateness" is
the key if dual representation is to arise.62
Both the United States and the United Kingdom provide a means for making this
assessment.63
A. THE U.S. APPROACH AND THE BEVILL, BRESLER FACTORS64
Under U.S. law, the executive has the burden of showing a personal attorney-client
relationship with corporate counsel and that the communications facilitated personal legal
advice being provided. 65 Courts often use five factors to evaluate the showing. This is
commonly called the Bevill, Bresler test:
1. The individual must show that he approached corporate counsel for the purpose of
seeking legal advice;
2. The individual must show that when he approached corporate counsel, he made it
clear that he was seeking legal advice in an individual capacity rather than as a repre-
sentative of the corporation;
3. The individual must show that corporate counsel communicated with him as an indi-
vidual, knowing that a potential conflict of interest could result from the dual
representation;
4. The individual must show that the communications with corporate counsel were
confidential; and
5. The individual must show that the substance of the communications did not concern
matters related either to (1) his official duties within the company or (2) general
affairs of the corporation. 66
These factors may be grouped into three categories. The first focuses on the executive-
corporate-counsel relationship. The presumption is that counsel already has one client,
the corporation. Consequently, the executive must show that a second, personal, attor-
ney-client relationship existed, too.67
Establishing this is not an easy task. The executive's subjective belief will not suffice. 68




63. In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 1986); R. (on the
application of Ford) v. Financial Services Authority, [2011] EWHC (Admin) 2583, [40] (Eng.); GERGACZ,
supra note 7, §§ 1:24, 2:11.
64. For a more thorough discussion, see GERGACZ, supra note 7, §§ 2:09-2:17.
65. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 571 (1st Cir. 2001) ("The default assumption is that the
attorney only represents the corporate entity, not the individuals within the corporate sphere, and it is the
individuals' burden to dispel that presumption.").
66. In re Bevill, 805 F.2d at 123.
67. See, e.g., In re GrandJury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333, 339-340 (4th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
68. In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d at 339.
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must be laid from which the relationship could be inferred.69 Courts are quite demanding
in this regard. Two cases illustrate this point. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Under Seal, the
executive was advised that counsel's client was the corporation.70 But, he was also told
that counsel could provide personal representation too. Nonetheless, the executive's as-
sertion that a personal attorney-client relationship existed was rejected. 7' A mere possibil-
ity that a personal relationship could occur did not establish that one did occur. 72 Direct
evidence was needed to move the showing beyond the executive's subjective belief.73
In In re Stein, the executive was not told that counsel's sole client was the partnership.74
But the partnership agreement provided that company counsel represented the members
as well.75 This backdrop, too, was deemed insufficient from which to infer a personal
attorney-client relationship.76 No statement was made that counsel represented the exec-
utive personally, nor was reliance on the agreement provision established.77 A personal
representation of the executive was, again, found to be no more than a subjective belief.
But if the executive leaps over this first hurdle, another one looms: the topic of the
communication must concern the executive personally.78 The "estate plan" illustration
noted earlier in this section is a good reference point. The executive's own rights, obliga-
tions, or liability must be the focal point of counsel's legal advice.79 If the communication
is about corporate affairs or the executive's role in the organization, then only corporate
interests are at stake.80 These communications are privileged for the corporate client
alone.8'
Establishing a personal rather than a corporate purpose when the communications
readily concern either one is a formidable task. Consider counsel representing both the
corporation and the executive where each faces liability arising from the same incident.
The executive's communications would serve two functions simultaneously, providing
counsel with corporate information so that the company's legal concerns could be evalu-
ated and assessing the executive's personal liability using the same words.
Nonetheless, the executive must show which sentences related to his own concerns and
distinguish them from the sentences conveyed to counsel on behalf of the corporation.82
Failure to do so means that no personal attorney-client privilege will attach.8 3
69. See id.
70. Id. at 336.
71. Id. at 341.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. United States v. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
75. Id. at 461.
76. Id. at 466.
77. Id.
78. In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1986); GERGACZ, supra
note 7, § 2:11.
79. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 156 F.3d 1038 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Greene v. Street, No. 10-
4529, 2012 WL 2423560 (E.D. Pa. 2012); In re Equaphor, Inc., No. 10-20490-BFK, 2012 WL 1682583
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012).
80. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 156 F.3d 1038; see also Greene, No. 10-4529, 2012 WL 2423560;
Equaphor, No. 10-20490-BFK, 2012 WL 1682583.
81. See, e.g., In re Grand fury Proceedings, 156 F.3d 1038.
82. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 156 F.3d at 1041.
83. Id.
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Of course, some clear signals could separate the remarks that deal with personal mat-
ters. 84 The executive could preface these comments by saying, for example, "the following
concerns my personal legal risk." Then, when that exchange is finished, the executive
could veer back into corporate mode by saying, for example, "now, returning to the cor-
poration's difficulties."
However, given the free form, overlapping, unstructured nature of communications,
such ready markers will not likely be found. In their absence, overcoming the presump-
tion that the executive's words were merely conveyed on the corporation's behalf is a
daunting requirement.
Note In re Stein as an example.85 The court held that even if the executive could estab-
lish a personal attorney-client relationship, the matters discussed were not shown to be
personal. 86 Consider that the communications concerned tax shelter issues that impli-
cated both the executive and the company.87 Nonetheless, they were not prefaced by a
focus on the executive's personal legal problems. Failure to separate the communications
in this fashion meant that they were deemed to belong to the company alone.88 Conse-
quently, this factor poses a major stumbling block for the executive seeking a personal
attorney-client privilege over certain communications.
The final Bevill, Bresler category is that the communications must fit within the attor-
ney-client privilege requirements. 89 Not every communication between client and attor-
ney qualifies as privileged. The Bevill, Bresler test requires no less.
Consider, for example, the confidentiality requirement. 90 The privilege requires that
the client show an expectation that the communications were undertaken in confidence.91
If counsel, instead, was gathering information that would be disclosed to a third party,
confidentiality would be lacking.92 No privilege would arise. In that event, a court may
not even consider the rest of the Bevill, Bresler test.93 There would be no need to deter-
mine whether, say, a personal attorney-client relationship existed because even if it did,
these non-confidential communications would not be privileged.
Overall, the Bevill, Bresler factors require too much of the executive. As a result, the
communicator's candor may be affected, and, thus, the flow of information to corporate
counsel could be compromised. This problem will be discussed in more depth later.94
84. See id.
85. United States v. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
86. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 465-66.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986); R. (on the applica-
tion of Ford) v. Financial Services Authority, [2011] EVVHC (Admin) 2583 (Eng.); GERGACZ, supra note 7,
§§ 1:24, 2:11.
90. United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 607-08 (9th Cit. 2009); see also Mueller Indus. v. Berkman, 927
N.E.2d 794, 806 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
91. Rueble, 583 F.3d at 607-08; see also Berkman, 927 N.E.2d at 806.
92. See Rueble, 583 F.3d at 607-08; see also Berkman, 927 N.E.2d at 806.
93. See Ruehle, 583 F.3d at 607-08; see also Berkman, 927 N.E.2d at 806.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 57-67.
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The United States is not the only jurisdiction to grapple with this issue. The United
Kingdom, too, has confronted it.9s Interestingly enough, the Bevill, Bressler test was con-
sidered and rejected by the British court. 96
B. THE U.K. APPROACH AND R. (ON THE APPLCATION OF FORD)
As in the United States, British law imposes the burden on the executive to establish a
personal attorney-client privilege with corporate counsel.97 But the elements of that
showing differ. In Britain, fewer elements are required.98 R. (on the application of Ford) is
the leading case.99 The facts in R. (on the application of Ford) are no different than those
that typically arise in the U.S. cases. First, there was no clear dual representation of both
the corporation and the executive. 00 The only retainer agreement was with the corpora-
tion.101 In addition, no document specified that at some later point the executive was
taken on as a client too.102 Finally, no joint corporation and executive relationship was
documented either.103 Instead, the executive's co-client relationship emerged from coun-
sel's representation of the corporation. 04
Keydata, the corporation, hired counsel to advice it concerning an investigation being
conducted by the Financial Services Authority. 05 Various executives communicated with
counsel about the matter. 0 6 These communications were covered by the corporation's
legal professional privilege.0 7
But it became apparent that the executives, too, faced legal problems arising from the
same incident.los Nonetheless, no personal attorney-client relationship with corporate
counsel was formalized.109 Nor did the executives retain their own private attorneys."o
One may speculate why this was the case. Perhaps at this point, the executives and
Keydata were "on the same team" and it was not envisioned that their interests would later
diverge to such an extent that the corporation would disclose the communications; maybe,
this tacit assumption was reinforced by the executive's positions of power within
Keydata."'1 As further conjecture, discussion of the executive's personal liability may
merely have been a manifestation of the human interaction that is inherent in representing
a corporate entity. After all, these Keydata executives had retained the attorney on behalf
95. R. (on the application of Ford) v. Fin. Serv. Auth., [2011] EWHC (Admin) 2583, [2012] 1 All E.R. 1238
(Eng.).









105. Id. T 7.
106. Id.
107. Id. 1 8.
108. See id. 7.
109. Id. T 7.
110. Id.
111. See id. 1 41-58.
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of the corporation.1 2 They held corporate positions empowering them to assert or waive
Keydata's legal professional privilege.1 3 The communications at issue were conducted by
these executives too."14
In any event, the control of Keydata changed."15 A court order put the corporation into
administration. The Financial Services Authority and Price Waterhouse Coopers, LLP
were appointed as administrators.'1 6 They decided to waive Keydata's privilege and dis-
close certain communications its executives had with counsel. 117 Unless the executives
could establish a personal attorney-client privilege, the communications could be used as
evidence against them." 8
In R. (on the application of Ford) the court formulated a five-part test to assess the execu-
tives' privilege claim:
1. That he communicated with the lawyer for the purpose of seeking advice in an indi-
vidual capacity;
2. That he made clear to the lawyer that he was seeking legal advice in an individual
capacity, rather than only as a representative of a corporate body;
3. That those with whom the joint privilege was claimed knew or ought to have appre-
ciated the legal position;
4. That the lawyer knew or ought to have appreciated that he was communicating with
the individual in that individual capacity; and
5. That the communication with the lawyer was confidential.'19
These factors focus on the following two issues: first, whether a personal relationship
with corporate counsel existed; and second, whether the communications were covered by
the legal professional privilege. These factors match up with the first and third categories
of the Bevill, Bresler test, discussed earlier.120 But unlike Bevill, Bresler, R. (on the application
of Ford) did not require the executive to show that the communications concerned per-
sonal rather than corporate matters.121 That portion of the U.S. approach, the court
noted, was derived from public policy factors that British law does not use to limit legal
professional privilege.122 This "public policy" was the concern that the corporation's priv-
ilege would be compromised if it may too readily be shared jointly with the executive.123
But public policy should not be considered the focal point of this Bevill, Bresler category.
There is a better view of the matter. The category seeks to apply basic privilege principles
to a corporate client by delineating which communications are individual ones as opposed
to corporate ones. This category draws boundary lines, so to speak.
112. Id. 7.
113. See id. $ 43-46.
114. Id.
115. Id. $ 7.
116. Id.
117. See id. 8.
118. Id. 9 37.
119. Id. $ 40.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
121. R. (on the application of Ford) v. Financial Services Authority, [2011] EWHC (Admin) 2583 (40],
[2012] 1 All E.R. 1238 (Eng.).
122. See id. 39.
123. See id. 9 40.
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The situation does not arise for "human being" clients. All of their communications are
theirs. But in the corporate setting, "others" than the "client" communicate. Bevill, Bres-
ler merely requires the separation of corporate communications from the others' personal
ones.124
Nonetheless, the U.K. standard requires less from the executive than does the U.S.
standard.125 An executive would have better odds of establishing a personal privilege
under U.K. law. Thus, between the two approaches, the United Kingdom's would have a
less adverse effect on executive candor.
On the other hand, a joint executive and corporation-client relationship with counsel
and, thus, a jointly-held privilege would more readily arise in the United Kingdom. In
fact, this was the result in R. (on the application of Ford).126 By making the joint relationship
more readily available in the United Kingdom than in the United States, the court im-
paired the protection the privilege provides in some circumstances to the corporate client
by transforming it into a shared endeavor. This problem will be discussed in depth
later.127
In short, neither the U.K.'s approach nor the U.S.'s Bevill, Bresler test is satisfactory.
The following two reasons may be pointed out: first, both approaches place too much
store in the corporate person metaphor. Further, they have repercussions that strain the
corporate privilege, albeit in different ways.
IV. Critique of the U.S. Approach (Bevill, Bresler Test) and the U.K.
Approach (R. (on the Application of Ford)
A. INADEQUACY OF THE "CORPORATE PERSON" METAPHOR WHEN APPLYING THE
ArrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A corporation does not exist in three dimensions. It is a concept in law that recognizes
a group as something apart from the members who comprise it.128 Envisioning this artifi-
cial "separateness" is fostered by the use of metaphor: the corporate "person" or, perhaps,
corporate "being." Through this metaphor, the abstract is made vivid. Describing the
corporation and its various members as distinct "persons" provides a shorthand for expres-
sing the essence of the organizational form, its independent group identity.
Metaphors, however, can obscure as well as illuminate, as illustrated by the discussion of
e e cummings' metaphor in this article's introduction.129 Just as leaning too heavily on the
word "music" in cummings's metaphor clouds his poetic expression, overextending the
corporate "person" metaphor distorts its objective in law.
Under the attorney-client privilege, the corporate "person" metaphor is apt when iden-
tifying the group's legal status, the identity of counsel's client. The corporate "person" as
client is merely descriptive of the focus of counsel's representation, the entity rather than
124. In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1986).
125. See R. (on the application of Ford), [20111 EWHC (Admin) 2583 [40], [2012] 1 All E.R. 1238.
126. Id. 1 36-40.
127. See inf-a text accompanying notes 68-75.
128. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) ("A corporation is an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.").
129. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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its constitute members.o30 By this use, the metaphor expresses the distinctive nature of
counsel's corporate client.
But the "person" metaphor breaks down when it focuses, instead, on actions that were
taken, such as communicating with counsel. A natural person can act. A metaphorical one
cannot. Presuming otherwise pushes the metaphor into areas where its expressive force is
unsuitable. Nonetheless, both the U.S. and U.K. approaches are based on the supposition
that the corporate "person" has acted-retained counsel, communicated, and waived its
privilege. A far better approach would have dealt with the unique characteristics of the
corporation where the privilege attributes (client status, communicator, and power to con-
trol) that are united within a natural person are split apart for the corporation.
Nonetheless, once that misstep was made, it was easy to merely count up the actors-
the corporation and the executive-and apply traditional privilege doctrine rather than
evaluate how the privilege policies played out in this scenario. The metaphorical "person"
was, thus, provided action-attributes it was never meant to possess.' 3' As a consequence,
Bevill, Bresler and R. (on the application ofFord) inadvertently put at risk the objectives of the
corporate privilege doctrine.
B. RISK TO CORPORATE PRIVILEGE: IMPEDE CANDID INFORMATION BEING
CONVEYED TO COUNSEL
An attorney-client privilege is justifiable because it encourages clients to confide in
counsel. The promise of confidentiality removes an impediment that may limit informa-
tion provided to counsel. Without accurate information, the quality of legal advice will
suffer. In that event, neither the interests of the client nor the system of justice will be
served.132
This explanation is reasonable when the client is a human being, where the communica-
tion, control, and protective character of the privilege are unified. But the rationale
breaks down for corporate clients where only the entity is protected by the privilege. 3
Unlike human clients, metaphorical "persons" cannot be motivated to communicate.
Only humans have such a capacity and the executives who do the corporation's communi-
cating are not included within its privilege.
These executives, of course, may be motivated by other factors, such as company loyalty
or the command to follow job requirements. Nonetheless, if those executives' communi-
cations can later be used against them, whatever other encouragements that exist may not
be enough to promote candor. After all, human clients have motivations other than privi-
130. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 571 (lst Cir. 2001) ("The default assumption is that the
attorney only represents the corporate entity, not the individuals within the corporate sphere, and it is the
individuals' burden to dispel that presumption.").
131. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) ("As an inanimate en-
tity, a corporation must act through agents. A corporation cannot speak directly to its lawyers. Similarly, it
cannot directly waive the privilege when disclosure is in its best interest. Each of these actions must necessa-
rily be undertaken by individuals empowered to act on behalf of the corporation.").
132. See supra notes 10-28 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Issued to Powers, 68 F.3d 480 (9th Cir. 1995); Diversified Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 n.5 (8th Cir. 1977) ("Ordinarily, the privilege belongs to the
corporation and an employee cannot himself claim the attorney-client privilege and prevent disclosure of
communications between himself and the corporation's counsel if the corporation has waived the privilege.").
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lege confidentiality to confide in counsel. Avoiding inaccurate, unsound legal advice is
one of them. But bestowing the privilege's confidentiality incentive on the human client-
communicator is deemed essential too.134
Nonetheless, no such incentive bucks up the executive, even though the executive is also
a human being. Apparently, communicating in the role of corporate executive is consid-
ered so distinctive, so rewarding, in-and-of-itself, as to negate the need for a confidential-
ity incentive. At least, that is the implication from the Bevill, Bresler and R. (on the
application of Ford) approaches.s35 Alas, human nature is not transformed by the mere
membership in a corporate organization.
Consequently, the legal advice provided to corporate clients is vulnerable because exec-
utives may withhold or slant the information they give.' 36 At some point, if not already,
case outcomes like the ones in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Under Seal and In re Stein, dis-
cussed above, will make executives wary of corporate counsel. After all, who knows
whether at some time in the future the executive, personally, may be called to task and the
same information he provided to counsel will be used against him? Self-preservation is a
strong deterrent to candor. Further, counsel may find that creating a trusting working
relationship with the executive is impeded.137
This state of affairs is particularly likely in the United States, where counsel is expected
to provide the executive with an Upjohn warning.138 Its message: communicate fully and
keep it confidential. But management, at will, can decide to disclose what you said, irre-
spective of the effect disclosure may have on you.' 39 In short, cooperate now, later you are
on your own. This is not a formula for inducing candor.
In short, both the Bevill, Bresler and R. (on the application of Ford) approaches impair the
corporate privilege doctrine, albeit to a lesser degree in the United Kingdom. The privi-
lege exists to encourage information flow to counsel. But, by failing to factor in the self-
interest of the information provider, the U.S. and U.K. approaches illogically set the cor-
porate privilege apart from the doctrine as applied to human clients.
Of course, this critique assumes that neither the tests in Bevill, Bresler40 nor R. (on the
application ofFord)141 were satisfied. If they were, the executive would be deemed a "joint-
134. Crosby v. Berger, 11 Paige Ch. 377, 378 (N.Y. Ch. 1844) ("The object of the rule, protecting privileged
communications from being disclosed by the attorney or counsel, is to secure to parties who have confided
the facts of their cases to their professional advisors, as such, the benefit of secrecy in relation to such commu-
nications; so that the client may disclose the whole of his case to his professional advisor, without any danger
that the facts thus communicated to his attorney or counsel will be used in evidence against him, without his
own consent.").
135. Unless the relevant approach is satisfied, the privilege belongs solely to the corporation, who may waive
it at will. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Issued to Powers, 68 F.3d at 480. There is no confidentiality
incentive provided, personally, to the executive.
136. See, e.g., Hatton v. Robinson, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 416, 422 (1833) (The individual's confidentiality
incentive is necessary to induce candid communication with his attorney).
137. See generallyJ. RANDOLPH AYRE, CORPORArE LEGAL DEPARTMENTS: STRATEGIES FOR THE 1980s 27
(Practising Law Institute, 1984); STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, FUNCTIONS OF CORPORATE LAw DEPART-
MENTS 27 (1961).
138. United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 604-07 (9th Cir. 2009); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.13 (2011).
139. See generally, GERGACZ, supra note 7, § 2:15.
140. In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986).
141. R (on the application of Ford) v. Fin. Servs. Auth., [20111 EVHC 2583 (Admin) (Eng.).
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client" with corporate counsel.142 As such, the executive would have a shared privilege
over the communications.143 In fact, the executive in R. (on the application of Ford) estab-
lished just that.' Unfortunately, the joint executive and corporation client outcome also
creates corporate privilege problems.
C. RISK TO CORPORATE PRIVILEGE: THE "JoIr-CLIENT" TRAP
Attorneys may represent multiple clients in the same legal matter. The co-clients' com-
munications with counsel are privileged even though the presence of one client means that
whatever the other communicated was not truly confidential.145 Usually a "third party's"
presence negates this privilege requirement.146
But joint clients are not considered "third parties" in relation to one another. They
have a shared, mutual interest in the legal affair and counsel's advice. Further, a joint-
client relationship has special features under the privilege. First, neither co-client may
assert the privilege against the other; second, the privilege can only be waived jointly.147
Neither co-client may do so unilaterally.
These features have noteworthy implications for a corporation. Ordinarily, executive
communications with corporate counsel only give rise to a corporate privilege; the execu-
tive is not included.14 But if the executive is a co-client, this is not the case.1 49 Neither
the corporation nor the executive may assert the privilege in a later dispute between them-
selves.ISO In addition, the corporation (or the executive) can only waive the privilege if the
other joint client consents.' 5'
Thus, under the joint-client rule, a corporation's control of its privilege is limited. In-
stead, control is shared with the same executive who, in normal circumstances, has no
personal stake.152 This result is a major departure from the usual privilege outcome.153
142. In re Bevill, 805 F.2d 120; R (on the application of Ford), [2011] EVTHC 2583 (Admin); GERGACZ, supra
note 7, §§ 1:24, 2:11.
143. Rudow v. Cohen, No. 85 Civ. 9323 (LBS), 1988 WL 13746, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1988).
144. R (on the application of Ford), [2011] EWHC 2583 (Admin), [59]-[60].
145. Britain: (joint interest legal professional privilege), R (on the application of Ford), 12011] EWHC 2583
(Admin), [16]-[18]. United States: (joint client rule), GERGACZ, supra note 7, § 3.64(2).
146. Britain: (joint interest legal professional privilege), R (on the application of Ford), [20111 EWHC 2583
(Admin), [161-[18]. United States: (joint client rule), GERGACZ, supra note 7, § 3.64(2).
147. Britain: (joint interest legal professional privilege), R (on the application of Ford) v. Fin. Servs. Auth.,
[2011] EWHC 2583 (Admin), [16]-[18] (Eng.). United States: (joint client rule), GERGAcz, supra note 7,
§ 3.64(2).
148. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 571 (1st Cit. 2001) ("The default assumption is that the
attorney only represents the corporate entity, not the individuals within the corporate sphere, and it is the
individuals' burden to dispel that presumption.").
149. See id.
150. Id. at 573.
151. See id. at 572-573.
152. See generally PAUL RICE ET AL., I ArrORNEY-CLIENr PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 4:32
(2013) (discussing specifics of attorney-client privilege when corporations and their directors, officers, and
employees are jointly represented).
153. "Within a corporate structure, the issue of joint representation has presented a particularly difficult
factual question ... on the one hand, the corporate entity has retained and paid for the services of both the
attorney and the directors, officers or employees who have acted for it and with whom the attorney had to
consult .... On the other hand, the conduct of those individuals who act for the corporation, and who are
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Consequently, one should expect management to have demonstrated an intent for the
corporation to enter into the atypical co-client relationship with one of its employees.
Management's duty should require no less.
Note that requiring that management manifest the corporation's intent is not foreign to
the corporate privilege. Establishing the privilege in the first place demands more than a
mere focus on the executive. For example, note the Upjohn requirements: the executive
communicated on orders of superiors, who have determined that the corporation needs
legal advice; the executive is aware of the reason for the communications and is ordered to
keep them confidential.154 These "instructions" show the corporation's "intent" to com-
municate with counsel. They emanate from management. If no "instructions" exist, the
corporation's privilege may not apply. 55
A similar management directive should preface the corporation's entering into a joint-
client relationship as well. Otherwise, the corporation may find itself "unconsciously"
trapped by the joint-client doctrine. Assessing the scope and control of the privilege when
the communications occur will then be quite difficult. For example, does the protection
belong solely to the corporation or will it later be found to be shared with the executive?
If the privilege is to be shared, are the special features of the joint-client rule, noted above,
acceptable? These are considerations that management should take into account.
Furthermore, a corporation cannot act on its own. 56 Management must order organi-
zation members to act on the entity's behalf. Without this management action, the corpo-
ration as a metaphorical "person," is inert, impassive, and quiescent. Consequently, in
absence of a management directive, the corporation should be no more capable of enter-
ing into a joint-client relationship than would an unconscious human being.
Nonetheless, neither Bevill, Bresler nor R. (on the application ofFord) looked for any man-
agement manifestation of corporate "intent." Both approaches, instead, focused solely on
the executive and whether he could establish a joint-client relationship with corporate
counsel. 57 It appears that they just presumed that the corporation would go along.
Further, these approaches were pressed into service when the executive faced personal
liability and his communications risked being revealed by management's waiver of the
corporation's privilege.158 By necessity, then, the executive sought to have the corpora-
tion's customary solo privilege recast into a joint-client arrangement.
Joint-client relationships between a corporation and its executive should not be estab-
lished as the executive's last resort. At the very least, the corporate co-client's interests, as
noted above, should have been included, too. Better yet, in absence of dual retainer agree-
'encouraged' by their superiors to communicate with corporate counsel so that informed advice can be ob-
tained by the corporation, often gives rise to personal liability (both civil and criminal) for the actors." Id.
154. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981); GERGACZ, supra note 7, § 3.64(2).
155. Hunkin v. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., No. 08-456, 2010 WL 93856, at *6 (W.D. La. Jan. 7,
2010); GERGACZ, supra note 7, § 3.87.
156. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) ("As an inanimate entity
. a.. [] corporation cannot speak directly to its lawyers. Similarly, it cannot directly waive the privilege when
disclosure is in its best interest. Each of these actions must necessarily be undertaken by individuals empow-
ered to act on behalf of the corporation.").
157. In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1986); R (on the
application of Ford) v. Fin. Servs. Auth., [2011] EWHC 2583 (Admin), [161-118] (Eng.).
158. In re Bevill, 805 F.2d at 124; R (on the application of Ford), [2011] EWHC 2583 (Admin), [8]; GERGACZ,
supra note 7, §§ 2:9-2:17.
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ments, the possibility of a joint corporation and executive relationship should be
abandoned.
In any event, what is needed is a fresh perspective in which the intricate relationships
within corporate organizations and the abstractness of a corporate client privilege take
center stage. The following proposal provides one.
IV. Proposal: Focus on Privilege Policies and Their Application to the
Corporation as "Client"
The Bevill, Bresler and R. (on the application ofFord) approaches should be abandoned. A
different perspective is needed to handle the executive communication confidentiality is-
sue. This perspective should be derived from both the policies underlying the privilege
and an evaluation of how those policies play out when a corporation is the cient.1s9 Fur-
ther, metaphors should be seen as merely literary devices, not as statements of the natural
state of things. The "corporate person" metaphor is the culprit here.
With this perspective as a starting point, a proposal can be constructed. This proposal
will have four purposes. First, it will encourage executives to candidly provide informa-
tion so counsel can give sound legal advice to the corporate client. Second, its application
and that of the corporation's privilege will be predictable at the time of the executive's
communication. Third, the different approaches in the United States and United King-
dom will be harmonized. Fourth, the proposal's application will be straightforward and
accomplished without great expense.
The proposal follows. It has four parts:
1. No personal, executive-corporate counsel relationship exists without an express re-
tainer agreement. If no agreement exists, the remainder of the proposal applies.
2. The executive is the "corporation's" communicator and all his words are deemed to
come from the "corporation," whether or not they qualify for the corporate
privilege.
3. The corporation has control over all its above communications. This control is not
shared unless an express agreement provides to the contrary.
4. Corporate communications only concern the corporation itself. They neither relate
to nor have consequences for the executive who made them.
A. THE PROPOSAL APPLIES PRIVILEGE POLICIES TO THE PARTICULARITIES OF THE
CORPORATE CLIENT
In both the United States and United Kingdom, the privilege is justified because it
removes an obstacle that may impede a client from confiding in counsel. To the point, the
privilege influences behavior.' 60
The client is motivated by the privilege's confidentiality shield, which the client con-
trols. Communication and control are linked together. Candor would hardly be pro-
159. GERGACZ, supra note 7, §§ 1:7-1:12, 1:22-1:23.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 10-16.
VOL. 47, NO. 3
COMPARING THE U.S. & U.K. 475
moted if communicators were at the mercy of some third party, who could later disclose
what was said.
For human beings, the client's identity, the communicator, and the source of control
are one-in-the-same. The privilege's confidentiality incentive suits the occasion because
the natural person, as client, is granted the privilege for communications he made unless
he decides to waive the protection.
But with corporations, this unity is split apart.161 The entity is the client that holds the
privilege. Neither the executive as communicator nor management who controls the cor-
porate privilege is covered.
The split negates the behavior incentive that the privilege was designed to foster. Con-
fidentiality provides no payoff to the participants in a corporate setting unless the execu-
tive's and management's interests are aligned. If so, the executive's communication will
remain confidential simply because management chose to assert the privilege on the cor-
poration's behalf. If the interests diverge, the executive's communications will be dis-
closed because management has waived the privilege.162
The proposal addresses this anomaly by tailoring the privilege to the fundamentals of
the corporate organization. Unless the executive has a personal retainer agreement with
corporate counsel, all of his communications are corporate ones. The executive's role
here is "communicator," named by management to provide information to corporate
counsel. That is all. His personal existence from a legal perspective is beside the question
in this setting.
Nonetheless, the executive does the act of communicating. These actions are human
ones. Consequently, they are not always tidy, well-structured, to-the-point exchanges.
Human communications unfold in unexpected ways and may wander away from their
planned purpose.
Perhaps at the outset, the weather is discussed or in the middle-of-nowhere, the majesty
of John Coltrane's "A Love Supreme" 63 comes up; maybe, the executive even raises per-
sonal legal matters associated with the corporate information being conveyed.
Whether a person communicates as an executive or otherwise does not alter the way
information is exchanged. If someone is apt to wax poetic, there is no reason to presume
that he changes when communicating in the role of the executive. Nonetheless, the back-
and-forth between the executive and corporate counsel all derives from the executive's
designation as corporate communicator. Nothing would be shared between them other-
wise. No corporate communications happen unless management provides the basis for
them to occur.
Therefore, once designated by management, all the executive's communications should
be deemed to come from the corporation. Whether any are tangential or even irrelevant
to the corporation's purpose in seeking legal advice should be of no consequence. The
question at this stage is not whether any are privileged, but rather, who made them?
Under the proposal, all are made by the "corporation." It would be misguided to dissect
each uttered phrase and categorize them as either corporate or non-corporate communi-
161. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348; Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1981); see generally,
GERGACZ, supra note 7.
162. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
163. JOHN COLTRANE, A LovE SUPREME (Impulse! Records 1965).
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cations. Such an effort unrealistically adheres to a communication model that is not re-
quired for human clients. After all, there is no doubt that all a human client says is a
"communication." The question is whether any of it is privileged. These are unrelated
inquiries and should similarly be separate when corporations are clients.
The proposal recognizes this. It distinguishes the executive as a "corporate communi-
cator" from the executive as a "person." In the communicator role, which is at issue here,
the executive has no personal existence. Consequently, the executive need not fear that
what is revealed can later be used against him. After all, the executive as a person did not
communicate. The communications, instead, were done by the "corporation." The exec-
utive was only an embodiment of the corporation. His "personality" did not exist.
Consequently, the only issue should be whether the communications fulfill the corpo-
rate privilege requirements. If so, they are protected by the corporation's privilege. If
not, they are discoverable. In any event, the contents have no relation to the executive,
personally. Whatever matters they cover are purely corporate irrespective of the particu-
lar words they contain. In short, for the executive as evidence, they are irrelevant.
Consider by way of analogy the actions of an executive who is directed to negotiate a
contract on behalf of the corporation. The executive may sign his own name to all corre-
spondence. He may also use words such as "your proposed terms are unacceptable to me"
or "I think we have a deal." Nonetheless, there are no doctrines comparable to Bevill,
Bresler or R. (on the application of Ford) that tie together both the executive and corporation
as co-parties to this contract. The executive's words, no matter how personal, do not
affect his status as corporate negotiator. Personally, the executive fades away. The propo-
sal, here, operates the same way.
This perspective molds the privilege to the realities of the corporation as client. No
metaphorical "person" communicates here. The proposal deals with the executive who
does. Further, the executive's protective shield arises from a functional view of the corpo-
ration; the corporation communicates through the executive. The executive's candor in-
centive comes from focusing on the organizational structure rather than from the
attorney-client privilege, which remains solely the province of the corporation. Thus, no
joint-client arrangement is necessary to provide protection for the executive. On the
other hand, if the executive, personally, and the corporation, through its management,
want to be co-clients, a joint-retainer agreement with corporate counsel can show their
intent.
As a final note, this proposal is consistent with other privilege doctrines specifically
created for corporate clients. For example, consider the following issues: who within the
corporation may waive its privilege;i(A can shareholders gain access to corporate commu-
nications, even though the privilege has been asserted;165 and is in-house counsel a corpo-
rate employee, a "lawyer," for privilege purposes?166 Each issue was resolved by a
doctrine specifically designed for corporate structures that shaped the privilege and its
policies to fit. This article's proposal follows the same approach.
164. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985); GERGACZ, supra note 7,
§§ 2:35-2:43.
165. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1095 (5th Cir. 1970); GFRGACZ, supra note 7, §§ 6.01-6.50.
166. Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 540 N.E.2d 703, 705-06 (N.Y. 1989); GERGACZ, supra note 7,
§§ 3.18-3.20.
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B. THE PROPOSAL HARMONIZES THE U.S. AND U.K. APPROACHES AND SIMPLIFIES
THE ANALYSIS
The U.S. and U.K. approaches for analyzing the executive confidentiality issue differ.
An executive confronted with U.S. law would have more difficulty establishing a joint-
client relationship than if U.K. law applied, instead. 167 Conversely, in the United States,
the corporation has less risk than in the United Kingdom that its executive's communica-
tions will be interpreted as coming from a co-client.' 68
There is no reason for these jurisdictions' laws to vary. Both the United States and
United Kingdom are common law countries and their privilege laws draw from a common
well.169 Neither the policies justifying a confidentiality protection for client communica-
tions nor the basic application of the privilege to corporate clients support the different
approaches.o70 In addition, overall, the U.S. and U.K. privilege doctrines are quite simi-
lar. The crime-fraud exception and waiver principles are representative.171
Consider too, that U.S. and U.K. privilege laws, when corporations are clients, gener-
ally converge. In the Nineteenth Century, courts in neither jurisdiction provided an ana-
lytical rationale when extending the privilege to corporate clients. Their decisions simply
presumed that the doctrine applied to corporate clients as well as natural ones.172
More recently, both the United States and United Kingdom recognized in-house coun-
sel as privilege-eligible lawyers.' 73 By way of contrast, under EU law, in-house counsel
are disqualified from conducting privileged communications with their corporate employ-
ers.174 With such an overlap between U.S. and U.K. privilege law, there is no call for the
differing Bevill, Bresler and R. (on the application of Ford) approaches.
On a practical level, clients need predictability at the time communication with counsel
occurs. If one cannot forecast in advance the scope of the confidentiality shield, the privi-
lege's candor-inducing benefit will fade away.175
Multinational corporations subject to both U.S. and U.K. law need to be able to make
this assessment, too. But the dissimilar Bevill, Bresler and R. (on the application of Ford)
approaches overly complicate the structuring of corporate counsel and executive commu-
nications at the time they occur.176 On the one hand, the corporate client may want to
167. See supra text accompanying notes 31-52.
168. See id.
169. See generally WIGMORE, supra note 12 at 2290; Hazard, supra note 12 at 1061. For a more thorough
discussion, see GERGACZ, supra note 7, § 1:22.
170. GERGACZ, supra note 7, §§ 1:7-1:12, 1:22-1:23.
171. See generally, GERGACZ, supra note 7, §§ 1:22-1:26, 4:1-5:63.
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avoid a joint-client relationship with its communicating executive. But on the other hand,
current corporate management may have no desire to expose the executive to personal
liability if those communications are later revealed. A change in management or circum-
stance may alter this intention. As discussed earlier, such an event can affect candor.177
Nonetheless, under the current laws, one cannot know which approach to apply until a
claim is raised under which Bevill, Bresler or R. (on the application of Ford) will become the
standard.
Thus, a uniform rule is worth having. But as discussed earlier, neither the current U.S.
nor U.K. approach is satisfactory.'17 The proposal corrects the flaws in these decisions
and provides a predictable way to assess the corporate privilege issue in both jurisdictions.
Lastly, the proposal has one additional yet significant feature. It will be less costly and
easier to apply than Bevill, Bresler or R. (on the application of Ford). Under the proposal,
unless the executive has a retainer agreement with corporate counsel, all of the executive's
communications come from the corporation. This is an inexpensive and straightforward
proposition to use; look for the agreement. If it exists, then the parties are in a joint-client
relationship.
Compare this undertaking with the effort required to apply Bevill, Bresler or R. (on the
application of Ford).179 The parties must sift through vast amounts of information in search
of bits that can be used to argue about the matter. But no bell rings when a joint-client
relationship is established, nor additionally in the United States, when an utterance by the
executive is "personal" rather than "corporate." To the contrary, the Bevill, Bresler and R.
(on the application of Ford) tests extract considerable judicial energy to grapple with these
distinctions.' 80
Privilege principles should not be so taxing. They support the adversary system's oper-
ation.' 81 Privilege should play a supporting role in litigation. It is not the touchstone
upon which the parties' dispute is decided.
But when evaluating privilege issues commands large expenditures of time and money,
the litigation becomes distorted. Additionally, the underlying dispute is left unattended
while the privilege issue takes center stage. Only the more well-heeled party or the one to
whom delay favors will benefit.
Bevill, Bresler and R. (on the application of Ford), unfortunately, increase these difficulties.
The proposal ameliorates them.
V. Summary
The United States and United Kingdom use different standards to assess whether a
communicating executive is in a joint-client relationship with corporate counsel. If no
relationship exists, the corporation's waiver of the privilege may result in the executive's
own words being used as evidence against him.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 57-67.
178. See spra text accompanying notes 53-75.
179. See sipra text accompanying notes 31-52.
180. R (on the application of Ford) v. Fin. Serys. Auth., 12011] EWHC 2583 (Admin), [41]-[611 (Eng.).
181. See spra text accompanying notes 10-11.
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As this article noted, the U.S. and U.K. approaches have their failings. The most nota-
ble one is that the courts in both jurisdictions overextended the "corporate person" meta-
phor and thus, inadvertently impaired policies that support the corporate privilege.
Furthermore, no purpose is served by the United States and United Kingdom having
different formulas for assessing this corporate privilege issue.
Consequently, a proposal to remedy these difficulties was offered. Its focus was on the
rationale for privileged communications rather than on the "corporate person" metaphor.
The proposal recognizes that communicators need an incentive to be candid and takes
into account the special nature of a corporation as a privileged client and the role of the
executive as its communicator.
The elements on which the proposal is based are common to both the attorney-client
privilege in the United States and the legal professional privilege in the United Kingdom.
The proposal transforms Bevill, Bresler (U.S.) and R. (on the application of Ford) (U.K.) into
a single test. Thus, corporations subject to both U.S. and U.K. laws will more readily be
able to predict the scope of their privilege confidentiality shield. Finally, the proposal
offers a less expensive and more straightforward rule than either Bevill, Bresler or R. (on the
application of Ford) provide.
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